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Extensive literature has shown that student attainment outcomes are affected by schools’
decisions to alter student-to-teacher ratios and overall teacher aptitude levels. However, these
ﬁndings provide little information to policymakers and school administrators for understanding
which teacher input decision provides the greatest student attainment return relative to the
associatedcosts. Thisstudyestimatescost-effectiveteacherinputstrategiesforU.S.highschools
seeking to either increase graduation rates or four-year college attendance rates by graduating
students. Empirical results indicate that reducing student-to-teacher ratios is the most cost-
effective teacher input decision for high schools seeking to improve graduation rates. However,
for schools whose objective is to increase four-year college attendance rates, it is more cost-
effective to allocate funds to improving teacher quality levels. These results put into question
policies such as class size reduction mandates, which disregard schools’ student attainment
objectives and institute generalized teacher hiring constraints.
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Extensiveresearchin theeconomicsofeducation literaturehasdebatedwhether raisingstudents’
attainment is best achieved by lowering student-to-teacher ratios or increasing teacher quality.1
This debate is misspeciﬁed. Undoubtedly, both strategies can improve student attainment
levels; however, this fundamental knowledge provides little insight for policymakers and
school administrators into choosing optimal teacher stafﬁng strategies, especially when limited
resources must be allocated to the most effective teacher input. Therefore, research focus
must transform from investigating whether teacher stafﬁng decisions are important to which
strategy is most cost-effective. The purpose of this paper is to respecify and advance the teacher
quantity/quality debate by quantifying the marginal student attainment returns for each dollar
invested in reducing class sizes and raising teacher quality.
Currently, little research has compared the cost-effectiveness of changing student-to-teacher
ratios and teacher quality levels, even though the cost-effectiveness valuation methods have been
prevalent in the education literature.2 In fact, most studies do not jointly estimate marginal
effects of changes in student-to-teachers ratios and teacher quality on student attainment. To
1A vast literature exists providing robust evidence that lowering student-to-teacher ratios or raising teacher
quality are signiﬁcant factors in increasing student attainment. For example, Angrist and Lavy (1999); Krueger
(1999); McKee, Rivkin, and Sims (2010); Ding and Lehrer (2005) show positive effects on attainment from
lower student-to-teacher ratios, and Summers and Wolfe (1977); Winkler (1975); Strauss and Sawyer (1986);
Ferguson(1991,1996);EhrenbergandBrewer(1994)ﬁndsimilarpositivecorrelationwithteachers’aptitudescores.
Moreover, Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander (2007); Monk (1994); Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor (2007); Goldhaber
and Anthony (2007) ﬁnd that degree type and teaching credentials have statistically signiﬁcant impacts on student
achievement. In addition to evidence from the literature, a simple thought experiment demonstrates that changes in
either the student-to-teacher ratio or teacher quality should affect attainment levels. Suppose that, ceteris parabus, a
teacher is replaced with another higher-quality teacher. At the end of a sufﬁciently long experimental period, there
is a trivial probability that student attainment is lower relative to the level expected to have been achieved with the
lower-quality teacher. Rather, a higher-quality teacher will likely result in student attainment levels to be equal or
greater. Similar outcomes are likely when, ceteris parabus, a teacher’s class size is decreased.
2Levin’s (1970) seminal study on cost-effectiveness in education illustrates a method for evaluating per dollar
returns associated with implementing various strategies intended to increase student attainment. Other studies (as
discussed in Levin (1988)) have used Levin’s approach to investigate schools in speciﬁc districts.
1our knowledge, only Hanushek et al. (2005) and Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor (2007) have
sought to empirically investigate which teacher stafﬁng strategy provides the largest impact on
student attainment when both strategies are available. Both studies determine that for elementary
school-aged children, increases in teacher quality offer greater student attainment returns than
reductions in student-to-teacher ratios. However, these studies have a critical limitation: neither
evaluates how empirical inferences and policy recommendations may change if ﬁnancially-
constrained schools are required to choose among the two teacher input strategies based on
student attainment returns per invested dollar.
This study seeks to estimate cost-effective teacher stafﬁng for increasing student attainment
in high schools. The empirical analysis implements a heterogeneous set of U.S. high schools
and the results indicate that optimal teacher input strategies are conditional on the effectiveness
and costs associated with each strategy. Speciﬁcally, we examine and compare two teacher
inputs identiﬁed by the literature to be consistently effective in improving student attainment:
reductions in student-to-teacher ratios and increases in overall teacher quality. Exploiting
variation in student-to-teacher ratios and teacher quality across U.S. high schools, we investigate
how changes in these measures affect two student attainment outcomes: graduation rates and
four-year college attendance rates by graduating seniors.3 To improve identiﬁcation of these
effects, our analysis explicitly controls for existing educational attainment measures and allows
us to focus on high schools with speciﬁc attainment goals.
3There is some debate over appropriate measures of school outputs. At the high school level, either student
test scores or educational attainment can measure achievement. Focusing on test scores permits an evaluation of
a particular skill (e.g., reading comprehension), while educational attainment is an overall measure of a schools’
performance to help students achieve a minimum set of skills. In this paper, we focus on educational attainment
measures of student achievement. Focusing on educational attainment at the high school level is intuitive given the
increased emphasis by policymakers and private organizations. For instances, the National Governors Association
announced a thirteen-state $42 million initiative in 2005 to lower high drop out rates and increase skills necessary
for success in college or the workplace. Grad Nation, a national movement to raise the graduation rate of all
schools to 90% by 2020, and the Winthrop Rockefeller Foundation’s ‘Move the Needle’, are initiatives that targets
graduation rates.
2The empirical estimation of cost-effective teacher input strategies is founded in a theoretical
model of schools’ hiring behaviors, which characterizes the interrelated employment decisions
of schools and teachers, each of whom attempt to maximize their respective objective functions.
We implementa two-stage estimation frameworkthat controls forpotential endogeneity between
educational attainment measures and teacher characteristics. In the ﬁrst stage, we model and
jointly estimate schools’ student-to-teacher ratios and teacher quality levels as a function of
teacher, school, and community characteristics and exclusion restrictions (state-level mandates
on bargaining on teacher compensation and class size limits, and state mandates on elementary
school class sizes). Predicted ﬁrst-stage teacher input estimates are then aggregated to the
school level and used to estimate student attainment measures using quantile regressions. This
modeling approach provides inferences about elasticities of teacher quantity and quality on
student attainment across each student attainment distribution; however, these estimates offer no
evidence as to which strategy is most cost-effective. To evaluate cost-effectiveness, we construct
cost functions for each teacher input strategy, combine these with estimated student attainment
returns elasticities, and determine optimal allocation of teacher input expenditures.
Our empirical results are consistent with ﬁndings in existing literature, which indicate that
both student-to-teacher ratios and teacher quality have statistically signiﬁcant effects on student
attainment outcomes. Moreover, the estimated conditional quantiles show that changes in
either teacher input affect four-year college attendance rates across the entire distribution of
attendance rates, but changes in student-to-teacher ratios or teacher quality are ineffective in
raising graduation rates in schools with high existing graduation rates. Furthermore, a $1,000
investment in raising teacher quality, ceteris paribus, is on average 17% more cost-effective in
increasing four-year college attendance rates than an equivalent investment in student-to-teacher
ratio reduction. Conversely, $1,000 invested to lowering student-to-teacher ratios is on average
319% more cost-effective in raising student graduation in schools with lower existing graduation
rates. Lastly, we ﬁnd that the cost-effectiveness of each teacher input decision is heterogeneous
across schools with varying existing levels of four-year college attendance and graduation rates.
This result can have important implications for improving efﬁcient resource allocation to high
schools, conditional on each school’s existing student attainment levels. Doing so may be more
optimal than imposing widespread, generalized teacher stafﬁng requirements.
2 A Theoretical Model of Educational Attainment
Our theoretical model of schools’ hiring behaviors follows the structure in Gilpin and
Kaganovich (2011). We assume that the objective of high school administrators is to attain
the highest per student education level, E, conditional on an exogenously administered budget,
B. To achieve this objective, schools choose the total quantity, Q =
R
W
h(n(w)), and overall
quality (teaching ability), A =
R
W
g(w n(w)), of its teachers, as well as the amount of other
inputs not associated with teachers, D.4 When choosing a particular level of teacher quantity
and quality, schools can hire an individual n(w) with teaching ability w 2W, where W represents
an exogenously determined teaching ability distribution across all individuals. The school-level
aggregation of these individuals and quality levels is characterized by the functions h() and g().
Lastly, each teacher and non-teacher input level is associated with costs whose overall amount
is assumed to exhaust a school’s available resources.
A high school’s maximization problem associated with a student attainment objective is
4School amenities available for students is one example of inputs that are not associated with teacher stafﬁng
decisions.
4characterized by the function:
max
fn(w);Dg
E = f(Q;A;D)
s:t:
B =
Z
W
w(w)n(w)+T
(1)
where w(w) represents the exogenously established market wage rate for an individual with
teaching ability w, and T are costs associated with non-teacher inputs.5 We assume that
educational attainment, E, is increasing with diminishing marginal returns in each input. Lastly,
in this study we focus on educational attainment outcomes associated with changes in teacher
inputs, Q and A, and therefore assume that schools use a separate teacher input budget, B < B.
In so doing, schools choose the quantity and quality of teachers that maximizes educational
attainment for some constant level of non-teacher inputs, D.
In addition to budgetary constraints, schools’ hiring decisions are indirectly affected by
teachers’decisionsto enterand/orremaininthe teachingprofession. Murnaneand Olsen(1989),
Eide, Goldhaber, and Brewer (2004), and Podgursky, Monroe, and Watson (2004) show that
college graduates with high aptitude test scores are less likely to enter the teaching profession
and employed teachers with high test scores are less likely to stay in the education section.
Moreover, Ballou (1996) ﬁnds that wage offers in public schools are not high enough to attract
individuals with better professional credentials. Therefore, in making optimal decisions about
5While the budget constraint speciﬁcation may appear elementary, the school ﬁnance literature has shown that
it is quite complex. First, the assumption that schools can obtain any quantity of a given quality teacher may not
hold in all geographic areas or parts of the quality distribution. Jepsen and Rivkin (2009) show that there may exist
a quantity-quality trade-off in the short-run when expanding quantity too rapidly. The literature on teacher mobility
between schools has shown that the labor elasticity of supply for schools with a predominantly low socioeconomic
student bodies is quite different than schools with predominantly high socioeconomic status student bodies (see
Imazeki (2005) and Gilpin (2011a, 2011b). Second, non-teacher inputs may not be exogenous for some teacher
hiring decisions such as large reductions in class sizes, which may require increased non-teaching inputs (see
Hanushek (1979) for a further discussion).
5the student-to-teacher ratio and teacher quality level, schools must also consider whether a
particular job offer will meet the wage, workload, and working environment expectations of
a potential teacher with quality w. Secondly, state mandates associated with teacher bargaining
rights and with working environments can also affect high schools’ and teachers’ employment
decisions. These considerations are critical in evaluating cost-effectiveness associated with a
particular educational attainment objective.
3 Empirical Speciﬁcation
The theoretical framework outlines schools’ strategies for maximizing student attainment by
altering the student-to-teacher ratio, teacher quality, or both. These teacher recruitment and
retention strategies are subject to a budget constraint and to considerations about whether
a particular job offer, consisting of information about wages and non-pecuniary school
characteristics, will attract a desired candidate. The observed aggregate teacher quantity and
quality levels are the implicit cumulative outcomes of schools’ recruiting and retention efforts,
which aid in meeting a particular educational attainment objective; our empirical framework
uses a two-stage estimation approach with exclusion restrictions to quantify these observed
relationships.
3.1 Returns to Student Attainment from Teacher Quantity and Quality
The ﬁrst stage of the empirical framework focuses on estimating educational attainment returns
associated with implementing each of the two teacher input strategies. An important concern
with directly estimating these relationships is that educational attainment measures and teacher
input decisions are likely endogenous. Therefore, we provide appropriate identiﬁcation of
6student-to-teacher ratio and teacher quality using a two-step estimation process. We ﬁrst identify
teacher input measures using exclusion restrictions and then use these estimates to model
educational attainment measures.
Following our theoretical speciﬁcation, we model teachers’ wages as a function of teachers’
experience, educational attainment, and bargaining constraints:
wi;j = g0+g1Xi+g2Xj+gZj+ni;j : (2)
The term wi;j represents the annual salary of teacher i in school j, Xi and Xj represent vectors
of teacher and school characteristics, and Zj is a vector of constraints corresponding to teacher
compensation and working conditions. Because our focus is to identify factors affecting teacher
inputs rather than wages, we use a reduced-form speciﬁcation for jointly modelling student-to-
teacher ratios and teacher quality. This reduced-form model is characterized by the following
system of equations:
qi;j = a0+a1wi;j+a2Xi+a3Xj+a4Zj+zi;j
ai;j = b0+b1wi;j+b2Xi+b3Xj+b4Zj+hi;j
(3)
where qi;j is the average number of students in classes taught by teacher i in school j and ai;j
is the observed scholastic aptitude of teacher i.6 We use the seemingly unrelated regression
6One could conceive of an alternative speciﬁcation with wages, quantity and quality of teachers being
simultaneously estimated. Indeed, Gilpin and Kaganovich (2011) demonstrate that only two of these three choice
variables may be set and that the budget constraint determines the remaining variable. We choose to allow quantity
and quality of teachers to be estimated and allow the budget constraint to determine wages, because our goal is
to understand how wage constraints affect the quantity and quality of teachers. That is, we directly incorporates
the wage function into equation (3) and estimate the reduced-form speciﬁcation. A similar estimation strategy is
performed by Stoddard (2003).
7estimator (SUR) with school-level cluster robust standard errors to jointly estimate equation (3).7
Next, wemodeleducationalattainmentoutcomesasfunctionsofschoolaggregatedpredicted
values, ˆ Qj and ˆ Aj. For each attainment type, estimation is performed using quantile regressions,
which provide important inferences about heterogeneous marginal effects associated with
changesinteacherinputsoneducationalattainmentatschoolsindifferentpartsoftheconditional
educational attainment distributions. In this manner, quantile regression estimations are used
to understand differences in the effectiveness of each teacher input decision conditional on a
school’s existing attainment level.8 Conditional regression quantiles for educational attainment
outcome E are characterized by:
Ej(f) = d0(f)+eE;Q(f) ˆ Qj+eE;A(f) ˆ Aj+d2(f)Yj+vj(f) (4)
where 0 < f < 1 is the proportion of educational attainment Ej in school j with outcomes below
thefth samplequantile, andYj representsavectorofschoolandcommunity-levelcharacteristics
that may also affect educational attainment. Standard errors are appropriately estimated by
bootstrapping.
For interpretative ease, coefﬁcients associated with Qj and Aj variables are presented as
elasticities, which are directly estimated in a double-log model speciﬁcation. That is, estimated
coefﬁcients eE;Q and eE;A are the elasticities of student attainment with respect to the student-
to-teacher ratio and teacher quality. These estimates indicate the steepest change in student
attainment due to changes in teacher inputs without accounting for costs of these changes.
7While unobservables could potentially bias the results, estimates using ﬁxed effects models demonstrate that
they are minimal and do not change the estimation results. This is likely due to the state-level exclusion restrictions
capturing unobserved heterogeneity. These results are available upon request.
8For an overview of quantile regression methods, see Koenker (2005).
83.2 Estimating Cost-effective Hiring Strategies
Given the above estimates that evaluate the effectiveness of reducing class size or raising teacher
quality on student attainment, we construct corresponding cost estimates for each hiring strategy.
As discussed in Levin (1988), cost-effectiveness analysis can be performed independently
from an evaluation of costs or cost functions can be constructed during the evaluation of
effectiveness by summing relevant costs. An advantage of jointly estimating cost functions
and investigated policies is that costs include unanticipated expenditures or unknown costs
associated with implementing these policies. A disadvantage is that these costs may not be
very generalizable across school districts. Alternatively, estimating cost functions separately
may be more generalizable but may not include all relevant costs. Thus, neither strategy is
clearly optimal, and in an effort to minimize measurement error we use the same data sources
for estimating policy effectiveness and expenditures associated with implementing teacher input
decisions.
Because we estimate elasticities among teacher inputs and student attainment across the
entire distribution of each attainment measure, we form corresponding cost estimates to
particular parts of the student attainment distributions. It is necessary to note that rapidly
reducing the student-to-teacher ratios may impose additional non-teaching costs, such as new
facilities, or cause a quantity-quality trade-off due to a reduction of overall teacher quality
through employment of less quality individuals. Therefore, we analyze policy interventions
on the margin and do not attempt to estimate large changes in teacher quantities or qualities.
Furthermore, we only analyze expenditures associated with schools hiring either the same
quantity of teachers (but of higher quality) or more of the same quality of teachers (such
that student-to-teacher ratios decrease without affecting overall teacher quality or non-school
inputs). Thus, we only capture direct expenditures associated with policy changes rather
9than an aggregate measure of total teacher and non-teacher expenditures. For example, costs
associated with reducing student-to-teacher ratios are per student expenditures necessary to
lower a teacher’s class size, and costs of increasing teacher quality are the wage expenditures
required to hire higher quality teachers.
We estimate expenditure elasticities associated with reducing the student-to-teacher ratio
and raising teacher quality at four quantiles in each of the student attainment distributions, f =
f20;40;60;80g. A general characterization of the expenditure elasticity between the mth teacher
input (m = fQ;Ag) and associated cost, wm, at the fth quantile of the Eth educational attainment
distribution is as follows:
eE
m;wm(f) =
Dm(f)
Dwm(f)

wm(f)
m(f)
: (5)
We estimate the slope (Dm(f)=Dwm(f)) around a representative values within each quantile,
m(f) and wm(f), and evaluate the elasticity at those representative values. To assure that outliers
do not bias the elasticity estimates, within each quantile of the student attainment distributions
we determine the median for the teacher input and associated cost, use the median absolute
deviation (MAD) to estimate the slope around those medians, and evaluate elasticities at the
median value.
To form cost-effectiveness measures, we combine the estimated expenditure elasticities
from equation (5) with estimated student attainment elasticities, eE;Q(f) and eE;A(f), shown
in equation (4). After minor manipulations, a cost-effectiveness measure can be written as a
percentage point change in educational attainment measure, DE, resulting from a percentage
change in costs, %Dwm, associated with increasing teacher input m. This cost-effectiveness
measure is characterized as:
DE(f) = eE;m(f)eE
m;wm(f)%Dwm(f)E(f) : (6)
10For two student attainment measures, two teacher inputs, and four quantiles, this procedures
generates sixteen estimated cost-effectiveness elasticities.
4 Data
The primary data for this study come from the restricted-access versions of the 1999-2000, 2003-
04, and the 2007-08 Schools and Stafﬁng Survey (SASS) conducted by the National Center for
Education Statistics. This survey incorporates questionnaires from roughly 50,000 teachers in
10,000 public schools every four years. The SASS data also contain precise teachers’ wage
and beneﬁt characteristics and several workload measurements such as the number of students,
classes, and preparations per teacher. Teachers’ non-pecuniary environment descriptors include
schools’ racial and gender diversity and poverty measures, such as the percentage of students
eligible for school lunch. The data also provide some limited school level student outcomes
including the percent of 12th graders who graduate and the percent of 12th graders who attend
four-year colleges. While these outcomes cannot be directly attributed to speciﬁc teachers, they
are representative of whether or not schools have achieved their assumed student educational
attainment goals.
Teacher quality is measured as a teacher’s scholastic aptitude in percentiles. Among
measurable teacher quality characteristics, the existing literature has shown that teachers’
scholastic aptitudes have the strongest (and consistent) effect on student outcomes.9 We do,
however, also control for other factors such as experience and education level. Since the SASS
data do not contain a direct measure of teacher aptitude, data from six rounds (1989-90, 1992-
93, 1995-96, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2007-08) of the restricted-access versions of the National Post-
Secondary Aid Survey (NPSAS) are used to construct scholastic achievement scores for each
9For example, see Greenwald, Hedges, and Laine (1996); Hanushek (1979, 1986); Hanushek et al. (2005).
11teacher. First, for each higher education institution we aggregate SAT and ACT scores of
students attending the institution, creating a single score for each university. Then, we match
each teacher in our sample to a representative aptitude score associated with the undergraduate
institution attended by the teacher. As a scholastic ability measure, this may provide better
precision than using either the selectivity of a higher education institution or its rank assigned
by sources such as the U.S. News & World Report or Barron’s.
Information on bargaining mandates are provided by the National Council on Teacher
Quality’s TQ3 database. These data provide details about the permissibility and the requirements
ofvariousbargainingagreements, includingtheprovisionsforindividualstobargainonteachers’
wages and class sizes in all ﬁfty states and the District of Columbia. Collective bargaining
by public school teachers is legally required, to some degree, in thirty-six of the ﬁfty-one
geographic entities. If teachers within a school are part of a collective bargaining agreement,
then they collectively agree on a particular salary schedule. They may also bargain separately on
a set of working conditions. In the remaining ﬁfteen states, collective bargaining is voluntarily
negotiated at the district level rather than being mandated by state law. We construct two
variables from these data: whether schools are prohibited to collectively bargain for wages and
for class size maximums. Furthermore, we use information on class size mandates in elementary
schools from the Council for Education Policy, Research and Improvement to construct an
indicator variable for whether the state also has an elementary school class size reduction
mandate during the sample period.10
After constructing the necessary variables, we separate schools (and associated teachers) into
two populations based on the school’s existing student attainment outcomes: high graduation
rates and low four-year college attendance rates. Identifying these populations has two important
10The Center also provides information on middle and high school class size mandates. However, almost no
states have high school class size reduction mandates
12implications. First, we are able to classify schools’ student attainment objectives based on
their existing attainment levels and thus minimize the uncertainty of each school’s true goals.
The second implication is that creating separate school populations addresses the potential for
teachers to self-select into schools based the school’s existing student attainment levels. Gilpin
(2011a) shows that an important factor explaining individuals’ decisions to work in a particular
school is schools’ student attainment levels. Within each population, however, conditional
sorting is minimized because at least one student attainment dimension is homogeneous and
schools focus on improving a single objective. That is, student attainment measures do not
contribute to explaining variation in the observed student-to-teacher ratio or teacher quality.
We assume that conditional on a school’s existing level of either graduation or four-
year college attendance rates, the school may place greater focus on increasing a particular
educational attainment measure. For example, schools that currently have very high graduation
rates (have reached a capacity) may place greater weight on the objective to increase their
students’ four-year college attendance. Alternatively, schools with relatively low four-year
college attendance rates may seek to maintain or improve graduation rates. That is, because
four-year college attendance rates are bounded by graduation rates (students are unable to attend
a college without ﬁrst graduating high school), the population of high schools that fall in the
lower part of the college attendance distribution can be used to investigate how teacher stafﬁng
decisions affect graduation rates. Figure 1 shows that there is a wide distribution of four-year
college attendance rates for high schools that graduate nearly all of their students and substantial
graduation rate variation among schools for which we observe low four-year college attendance
rates. Conditioning the empirical analyses on schools’ existing level of educational attainment
allows for a natural separation of data, which can offer more straightforward inferences about
cost-effective educational attainment improvement strategies for each attainment objective. We
13assume that schools in each population focus on one objective, and they do so by altering the
student-to-teacher ratio and/or the teacher quality level.11
To construct the appropriate populations, we determine thresholds that separate schools
into those with high graduation rates and those with low four-year college attendance rates.
Thresholds are estimated using a grid-search in order to determine the highest possible value
for four-year college attendance rates and the lowest possible graduation rate such that within
the resulting school populations, t- and F-tests indicate that student attainment measures do
not signiﬁcantly determine either teacher quality or student-to-teacher ratios in equation (3).
The estimated threshold is 99% for schools with very high graduation rates focused on raising
college attendance and 45% for schools with low college attendance rates focused on raising
graduation rates. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the variables used in the estimations and provides
summary statistics for the two types of school populations.
5 Results of Empirical Analyses
5.1 Estimation Results of the Teacher Quantity and Quality Models
Our empirical strategy is intended to provide appropriate identiﬁcation for the numerous
complexities associated with characterizing the relationship among teacher quantity and quality,
student attainment measures, and state mandates. For each school population type, we estimate
factors affecting teacher input decisions in high schools using seemingly unrelated regressions
(SUR). Exclusion restrictions used for appropriate identiﬁcation of teacher inputs are consistent
with those implemented by studies in the existing literature (for example, see Hoxby, 1996; ?; ?;
11As discussed in footnote 5, teachers may self-select into schools with desired student attainment levels.
Sub-sampling data by existing attainment levels eliminates this selection problem and provides a medium for
investigating unidirectional impacts of teachers on student attainment.
14?). We include four exclusion restrictions: the ﬁrst restriction is whether the school (or teacher)
is in a state that permits collective bargaining for compensation; the second is whether the school
(or teacher) is in a state that permits collective bargaining for working environments; the third is
whether the state has an elementary school class size mandate; and the fourth is the percent of
school ﬁnance appropriated by local funding.
Table 3 (top) presents SUR estimation results for schools that seek to improve four-year
college attendance rates. As expected, high schools located in more afﬂuent communities tend to
have lower student-to-teacher ratios, as indicated by the statistically signiﬁcant effects of higher
median community incomes and the interaction between median community income and percent
of school ﬁnance appropriated by local funding. Moreover, schools with a higher proportion of
students eligible for free lunches have lower student-to-teacher ratios. Furthermore, student-to-
teacher ratios can be identiﬁed by evaluating state school-related policies. States that mandate
lower elementary schools’ class sizes, potentially diverting resources away from high schools,
tend to have higher student-to-teacher ratios in high schools.12 Lastly, teachers in rural schools
tend to have lower student-to-teacher ratios.
Teacher quality is identiﬁed by teacher, school, and community characteristics and state
mandates. Increases in the number of teachers with Master’s degrees raise the overall quality
of the teacher body. However, the estimated negative marginal effect of the interaction between
teacherqualityandmoreexperiencedindividualsindicatesthatindividualsofloweraptitudewho
remain in education tend to compensate with additional education. Furthermore, schools located
in states where teachers are able to bargain either on compensation or their work environment
raises teacher quality. Lastly, schools located in communities with higher median community
12Bargaining collectively for wages or work environment are statistically insigniﬁcant. Although this is
somewhat surprising, it is necessary to note that when elementary schools class size mandates are excluded from
the regression, the coefﬁcient associated with the mandate to bargain for work environment conditions becomes
signiﬁcant. Therefore, it seems that both variables’ effects cannot be identiﬁed jointly.
15incomes, where a higher percentage of income is funded locally and there is a lower proportion
of minority students, have higher teacher quality.13
Table 3 (bottom) presents SUR estimation results for schools seeking to improve graduation
rates. Except for slight variation in the marginal effect magnitudes, variables that statistically
signiﬁcantly identify student-to-teacher ratios and overall teacher quality in schools focusing
on improving college attendance rates are also ones that identify teacher quantity and quality
measures in schools seeking to raise graduation rates. Although this is of little surprise, there is
one difference. Teacher quality is not identiﬁed by state mandates providing teachers with the
ability to collectively bargain on working environments. This is likely because policies targeting
lower student-to-teacher ratios already exist in this school population, which substantially
reduces teachers’ abilities to bargain on class size.
5.2 Estimation Results of the Student Achievement Model
Using the above results, we construct aggregate predicted student-to-teacher ratios and teacher
quality for the second-stage estimation. These predicted measures are exogenous to student
attainment and are used to explain variation in attainment measures. To evaluate these
relationships, we estimate quantile regressions for each student attainment distribution and
perform a 250-iteration bootstrap to approximate standard errors. Speciﬁcally, in each school
population, we estimate separate quantile regressions for estimating teacher inputs affecting
four-year college attendance rates and graduation rates. Estimated conditional quantiles provide
important inference about potential non-linear marginal effects of teacher inputs on attainment
measures across the student attainment distributions. Both student attainment measures and all
continuous explanatory variables are in natural log form.
13While teachers can sort on student body characteristics, as discussed in the previous section, we verify that
teachers do not sort on student attainment.
16For schools focusing on raising four-year college attendance rates, quantile regression results
for the 20th, 40th, 60th, and 80th sample quantiles are presented in Table 4 and for the entire four-
year college attendance rate distribution in Figure 2. Both descriptive and visual estimation
results indicate that reducing student-to-teacher ratio or increasing teacher quality levels have
statistically signiﬁcant marginal effects on raising four-year college attendance rates across the
entire conditional college attendance rate distribution. However, these marginal effects are
non-linear, because changes in student-to-teacher ratios or teacher quality have greater impacts
on improving college attendance in schools with low existing college attendance rates than in
schools with high existing college attendance rates. At the 20th sample quantile, a 1% increase in
teacher quality raises college attendance by 1.82%, and at the 80th sample quantile, the marginal
effects falls to 0.74%. Similarly, a 1% decrease in the student-to-teacher ratio increases four-year
college attendance rates by 1.33% at the 20th sample quantile and by 0.97% at the 80th quantiles.
Therefore, because both teacher inputs have statistically signiﬁcant effects on raising four-year
college attendance rates, cost-effectiveness measures are necessary to determine which teacher
input change will maximize student attainment returns per unit of investment.14
Quantile regression results for schools whose objective is to improve graduation rates are
also presented in Table 4 and Figure 3. General inferences from these results are similar to those
estimated for the school population seeking to raise four-year college attendance rates. Marginal
effects of both student-to-teacher ratio and overall teacher quality are statistically signiﬁcant
across the majority of the conditional graduation rate distribution and become statistically
insigniﬁcant at the upper-most (80th) sample quantile. Both teacher inputs have the largest
marginal impacts on graduation rates in high schools where existing graduation rates are low,
but the magnitude of these impacts decrease for schools with higher existing graduation rates.
14It should be noted that even if the one hiring strategy dominates the other in terms of magnitude of effect on
the student attainment, the costs may be prohibitively high to implement.
17Speciﬁcally, a 1% decrease in the student-to-teacher ratio or a 1% increase in teacher aptitude
will increase graduation by 0.48% and 0.76%, respectively, in the lowest 20th sample quantile.
Atthe60th samplequantile, theseeffectsareonly0.12%and0.25%, respectively. Itisinteresting
to note that the return to teacher inputs is larger on raising college attendance rates than raising
graduation rates.
5.3 Results of the Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
Results of the quantile regressions indicate that improvements in student attainment can be
achieved through changes in either student-to-teacher ratios or teacher quality levels. However,
these results provide little information about the degree to which student attainment can improve
for a given change in teacher input expenditures. This study intends to go beyond simply
showing that altering either of these two factors is important, providing an understanding of
the cost-effectiveness of each strategy. The quantile regression results provide a fundamental
understanding of student attainment elasticities with respect to changes in teacher inputs;
constructing expenditures elasticities will aid in understanding how costly it is to change teacher
quantity and quality.
Estimated cost-effectiveness measures for altering both student attainment measures are
presented in Table 5.15 For schools seeking to increase four-year college attendance rates and
with existing attendance rates in the 20th, 40th, or 60th sample quantiles, it is most cost-effective
to increase expenditures on improving teacher quality, and in the 80th sample quantile, reducing
student-to-teacher ratio becomes more cost-effective. Speciﬁcally, for a $1,000 per teacher base
salary increase for higher quality teachers (maintaining the existing student-to-teacher ratio),
college attendance rates increase by 0.77, 1.32 and 1.12 percentage points for high schools in
15Intermediate information necessary to estimate ﬁnal cost-effectiveness measures are presented in Table 4.
18the 20th, 40th, or 60th sample four-year college attendance quantiles. The same expenditure on
reducing student-to-teacher ratios (maintaining the existing level of teacher quality) would result
in 0.54, 1.03 and 0.86 percentage point college attendance increases. However, for schools in the
80th sample quantile, a $1,000 per teacher base salary increase should be allocated to decreasing
student-to-teacher ratios, because doing so increases college attendance rates by 0.35 percentage
points more than increasing teacher quality. The switch in cost-effective teacher input strategies
at the highest sample quantile is due to a much rapid decrease in the returns to teacher quality
across the four-year college attendance distribution. This implies that for schools with high
existing college attendance rates, it is more cost-effective to hire an additional teacher, who will
have a similar quality as the existing teacher body, than to attempt to marginally increase overall
teacher aptitude at an excessive cost.
Results presented Table 5 also indicate that for high schools seeking to increase graduation
rates, itisalwaysmorecost-effectivetoreducestudent-to-teacherratios. Fora$1,000perteacher
base salary increase, high schools in the 20th, 40th, or 60th sample graduation rate quantiles
can experience 0.06, 0.03, and 0.20 percentage points additional graduation when reducing
student-to-teacher ratios than when allocating the funds to improving teacher quality. Because
the estimated marginal effects of teacher inputs on student attainment measures are statistically
insigniﬁcant at the 80th sample quantile, we are unable to infer cost-effectiveness measures for
schools with relatively high existing graduation rates.
6 Conclusions and Policy Implications
Improving student attainment outcomes is a major objective of school administrators and
policymakers. Consequently, the literature has focused on investigating factors affecting
attainment levels. Studies have repeatedly found that attainment outcomes are signiﬁcantly
19impacted by teacher input decisions. However, although critical to understanding approaches
for improving student attainment, these studies cannot be used to infer which teacher input
decision is optimal. First, while most research does account for student body characteristics,
few explicitly condition teacher input strategies on schools’ existing attainment levels,
generalizing policy recommendations across schools that may have different student attainment
objectives. More importantly, policy recommendations do not account for costs associated
with implementing a reduction in student-to-teacher ratios or an increase in teacher quality.
Therefore, the impact of altering a particular teacher input is much less certain when schools
face budgetary constraints.
This study advances the literature by estimating cost-effective teacher input strategies for
U.S. high schools seeking to increase graduation rates or four-year college attendance rates.
Our empirical results indicate that there is no comprehensive teacher input policy for increasing
student attainment levels, and that the impacts of particular teacher input decisions are not
homogeneous across high schools. Speciﬁcally, for high schools seeking to increase graduation
rates, it is more cost-effective to reduce student-to-teacher ratios rather than raise teacher
quality. That is, there is a greater student attainment return from a dollar of investment in
reducingclasssizesthanfrominvestinginteacherquality. Conversely, increasingteacherquality
is a more cost-effective strategy for schools whose objective is improving four-year college
attendance rates for schools below the 80th percentile in the college attendance distribution while
the investing in lowering the student-to-teacher ratio is more cost-effective at above the 80th
percentile. However, for both student attainment objectives, the marginal effect of investments
in a particular teacher input decreases as schools’ attainment levels increase.
Our ﬁndings bring into question the use of unconditional, blanket state mandates and
hiring constraints imposed by policymakers. The results of our analysis make clear that these
20constraints can bind the quantity and quality of hired teachers. Consequently, these constraints
can lead to substantial inefﬁciencies in the teacher input decision-making process and contribute
to foregone student attainment improvements if they are binding. For example, imposing a class
size mandate on high schools seeking to improve four-year college attendance rates can cause
these schools to sub-optimally allocate investments into teacher inputs that do not maximize
attainment returns. Therefore, because high schools in the same state (or even district) may
not have the same student attainment levels and objectives, effective policies must account for
potential heterogeneity that exists across these schools.
Because both the quantity and quality of teachers are effective at improving student
attainment levels, the results of this study provide a ﬁrst step to respecifying the teacher
quantity/quality debate from estimating effective hiring strategies to estimating cost-effective
hiring strategies. This requires researchers to not only evaluate school and teacher policy effects
on student attainment, but to determine how costs associated with implementing each policy can
impact the policy’s effectiveness.
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25Table 1: Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics for Hiring Decision Regressions
Variablea College Attendanceb Graduationc
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Dependent Variables
Student-to-teacher ratio 20.52 8.83 22.71 9.50
Teacher quality - aptitude 50.96 16.44 49.23 16.40
Teacher Characteristics
Years of teaching experience 14.31 10.62 13.55 10.37
Has Master’s degree 0.47 0.46
School Characteristics
Percent of students eligible for free lunch 15.85 23.17 21.08 27.57
Percent minority students 20.20 25.67 34.78 31.86
In metro area 0.12 0.21
In rural area 0.48 0.38
Community Characteristics
Median incomed $49.5 $19.2 $45.7 $14.3
Hiring Decision Constraints
Collective bargaining for compensation mandate in state 0.66 0.59
Collective bargaining for working conditions mandate in state 0.19 0.16
Elementary school class size mandate in state 0.45 0.51
Percent of school ﬁnance appropriated by local ﬁnance 0.45 0.21 0.39 0.18
Sample Sizee 4,290 8,670
a Standard deviations are not reported for 0=1 dummy variables.
b Observations are from population of schools in which graduation rates are greater than or equal to 99%.
c Observations are from population of schools in which four-year college attendance rates are less than
or equal to 45%.
d In thousands of 2007 dollars.
e All sample sizes are rounded to nearest 10 to comply with data-use license restriction.Table 2: Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics for Student Attainment Regressions
Variablea College Attendanceb Graduationc
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Dependent Variable 50.987 21.630 90.051 14.549
Hiring Decision Characteristics
\ Student-to-teacher ratio 18.80 6.54 21.34 6.15
\ Teacher quality 49.80 11.09 49.46 10.71
School Characteristics
Percent of students eligible for free lunch 19.74 25.46 16.41 22.62
Total students in school 457 451 688 558
In metro area 0.04 0.16
In rural area 0.45 0.44 0.59 0.47
Community Characteristics
Percent with Bachelor’s degree or higher 0.25 .16 0.24 .13
Sample Sizee 570 1,330
a Standard deviations are not reported for 0=1 dummy variables.
b Observations are from population of schools in which graduation rates are greater than or equal to 99%.
c Observations are from population of schools in which four-year college attendance rates are less than
or equal to 45%.
d In 2007 dollars.
e All sample sizes are rounded to nearest 10 to comply with data-use license restriction.Table 3: SUR Estimation Results for Student-to-teacher ratio and Teacher Quality
Four-year College Attendance Rate
Student-to-teacher ratio Teacher quality
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
Total experience 0.120 0.94 -0.276 -1.22
Total experience, squared -0.001 -0.23 0.009 1.47
Masters degree 1.511 1.05 10.832*** 4.28
Tot. exp  masters degree -0.023 -0.28 -0.350** -2.44
Percent students eligible for free lunch -0.049*** -4.23 -0.023 -1.12
Percent minority students 0.009 0.69 -0.083*** -3.84
Metro school 1.174 0.85 0.861 0.35
Rural school -3.722*** -5.67 -1.978* -1.70
Median income 0.202*** 3.62 0.362*** 3.48
Median income  % local funds -0.238*** -3.10 -0.494*** -3.42
Bargaining for class size 0.784 1.01 2.883** 2.10
Bargaining for wages – – 2.266** 2.22
Elem. school class size mandate 1.558*** 2.89 – –
% local funds 5.254 1.36 23.115*** 3.27
Constant 12.458*** 4.62 33.285*** 7.05
R2 0.208
Graduation Rate
Student-to-teacher ratio Teacher quality
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
Total experience 0.031 0.29 0.069 0.38
Total experience, squared -0.002 -0.54 -0.001 -0.17
Masters degree 0.443 0.43 6.793*** 3.76
Tot. exp  masters degree 0.062 1.05 -0.259** -2.49
Percent students eligible for free lunch -0.026*** -3.99 -0.012 -1.02
Percent minority students 0.003 0.38 -0.062*** -5.43
Median income 0.083*** 2.67 0.335*** 6.05
Median income  % local funds -0.137*** -2.76 -0.459*** -5.26
Metro school 0.794 1.36 2.438** 2.39
Rural school -3.730*** -8.66 -0.295 -0.39
Bargaining for class size 0.354 0.76 0.349 0.42
Bargaining for wages – – 2.129*** 3.45
Elem. school class size mandate 0.615* 1.83 – –
% local funds 2.686 1.05 27.539*** 6.07
Constant 20.179*** 12.38 30.811*** 10.88
R2 0.128
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.Table 4: Estimated Educational Attainment Effectiveness of Quantity and Quality of Teachers
and Teacher Input Cost Elasticities
Four-year College Attendance Rates
20th quantile 40th quantile 60th quantile 80th quantile
eC;Q -1.325* -1.317*** -1.018*** -0.972***
eC;A 1.820** 1.442*** 1.150*** 0.735***
eC
Q;wQ -0.940 -0.989 -0.858 -0.878
eC
A;wA 0.951 1.140 0.946 0.771
eC;wQ 1.246 1.303 0.874 0.853
eC;wA 1.730 1.643 1.088 0.566
Median student-to-teacher ratio 20.665 21.830 22.123 21.603
Median aptitude points 47.601 49.780 50.484 50.802
Median cost per student $2,112 $2,033 $2,067 $2,067
Median cost per aptitude point $911 $886 $890 $888
Four-year college attendance rate 19 35 45 55
Graduation Rates
20th quantile 40th quantile 60th quantile 80th quantile
eG;Q -0.756*** -0.370*** -0.245*** -0.057
eG;A 0.483*** 0.242*** 0.123*** 0.013
eG
Q;wQ -0.878 -0.787 -0.854 -0.738
eG
A;wA 1.281 1.104 0.917 1.019
eG;wQ 0.663 0.291 0.209 0.042
eG;wA 0.619 0.267 0.113 0.013
Median student-to-teacher ratio 22.324 22.462 22.022 21.500
Median aptitude points 49.427 50.637 50.730 51.423
Median cost per student $ 2,058 $ 2,036 $ 2,051 $ 2,071
Median cost per aptitude point $909 894 906 869
Graduation Rate 84.0 92.2 95.5 97.5
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels in quantile regression estimations.
eC;Q (eG;Q): Elasticity of college attendance (graduation) rate w.r.t. changes in student-to-teacher ratio. Quantile
regression estimates of equation (4). Full results available upon request.
eC;A (eG;A): Elasticity of college attendance (graduation) rate w.r.t. changes in teacher quality. Quantile regression
estimates of equation (4). Full results available upon request.
eC
Q;wQ (eG
Q;wQ): Elasticity of student-to-teacher ratio w.r.t. costs per student for college attendance (graduation).
eC
A;wA (eG
A;wA): Elasticity of teacher quality w.r.t. costs per aptitude point for college attendance (graduation).
eC;wQ (eG;wQ): Elasticity of college attendance (graduation) rate w.r.t. costs per student.
eC;wA (eG;wA): Elasticity of college attendance (graduation) rate w.r.t. costs per aptitude point.Table 5: Cost-effectiveness per $1,000 teacher input investmenta
Four-year College Attendance Rates
20th quantile 40th quantile 60th quantile 80th quantile
Lower student-to-teacher ratio 0.543 1.027 0.860 1.051
Raise teacher quality 0.766 1.322 1.120 0.702
Graduation Rates
20th quantile 40th quantile 60th quantile 80th quantileb
Lower student-to-teacher ratio 1.213 0.586 0.442 0.092
Raise teacher quality 1.150 0.552 0.241 0.030
a Percentage point change in educational attainment associated with a $1,000 base pay per teacher change in
teacher input investments.
b Changes in student-to-teacher ratios or teacher quality have no statistically signiﬁcant effect on increasing
graduation rates in the 80th sample quantile.Figure 1: Graduation and College Attendance RatesFigure 2: Quantile Regression Results for Four-year College Enrollment Model
Note: Quantile regression estimate, 90% conﬁdence band, and zero reference line are shown. In sample quantiles
where the conﬁdence band includes the zero line, changes in teacher inputs do not have a statistically signiﬁcant
marginal effect on student attainment measures.Figure 3: Quantile Regression Results for Graduation Rate Model
Note: Quantile regression estimate, 90% conﬁdence band, and zero reference line are shown. In sample quantiles
where the conﬁdence band includes the zero line, changes in teacher inputs do not have a statistically signiﬁcant
marginal effect on student attainment measures.